A difficult choice

**A Difficult Choice**

The arrival of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian at the Turkmen resort town of Avaza near the port city of Turkmenbashi became, perhaps, the main intrigue of the anniversary CIS summit, and possibly of the entire past week.

Although the oldest integration association of the former USSR countries—from which some post-Soviet states have withdrawn over the 35 years of its existence, while the rest continue to half-belong to this half-alive "union of sworn friends"—has long ceased to promise any intriguing news hooks…

Pezeshkian turned out to be the first politician from outside the post-Soviet space to take part as an observer in a gathering that, it would seem, had long lost any practical meaning. In itself, this became a notable diplomatic event: a state that was never part of the USSR appeared at a platform that historically arose for the "civilized divorce" of the Union republics, which had once been "united forever by Great Rus."

It was the Iranian president who saved the summit in Avaza from becoming completely meaningless. After all, by and large, against the backdrop of the EAEU and the CSTO, the very existence of the CIS in its current form looks like absolute nonsense.

Pezeshkian proposed creating a "CIS+1" format—a mechanism for interaction between the Commonwealth countries and Iran. Its agenda includes transport, energy, trade, investments, technological cooperation, and regional security. The Iranian president also spoke in favor of developing financial and barter mechanisms that would allow supporting trade under conditions of sanctions and other external pressure.

**What is Good for Russia is for Kazakhstan…**

Tehran's proposal, of course, does not mean either the launch of the procedure for Iran's accession to the CIS or the creation of a new international union. It is about an attempt to institutionalize Iran's already existing interests in the Central Asian region.

There is also a political motive here. In the context of confrontation with the US, Iran seeks to expand the circle of partners and reduce dependence on a limited number of external counterparties. A multilateral platform allows it to talk to several states at once, without reducing regional policy to relations with Moscow or Beijing.

For Russia, Iran's appearance at the summit also has both symbolic and practical significance. Moscow seeks to preserve the CIS as a mechanism for interaction with the former Soviet republics. On October 9, Vladimir Putin emphasized the importance of economic, cultural, and linguistic ties between the Commonwealth countries, as well as the expansion of settlements in national currencies. According to him, Russian trade with the CIS countries exceeded $110 billion in 2025.

Under conditions of sanctions and the ongoing war with Ukraine, the development of alternative transport, financial, and trade channels acquires additional value for Russia. And Iran's appearance in the CIS orbit fits into the Kremlin's logic.

However, it would be a mistake to automatically consider Tehran an instrument of Moscow. Iran has its own foreign policy, its own economic interests, and its own contradictions with other states in the region. Iran and Russia can cooperate on issues of sanctions pressure and transport infrastructure, but at the same time compete for sales markets, energy buyers, and transit flows.

Nevertheless, Iran's appearance could change the political perception of the Commonwealth. CIS+1 will be perceived in the world no longer just as a semi-marginal "private gathering," but as an attempt to create a new anti-Western union that goes beyond the post-Soviet space. This is undoubtedly to the hand of today's Russia, but could become a problem for Kazakhstan.

**Everything Except Politics!**

For Astana, cooperation with Iran has a very specific economic justification. Kazakhstan needs additional export routes, new sales markets, and the ability to reduce dependence on a limited number of transit directions. Access to the Persian Gulf and further to the markets of South Asia is capable of supplementing the existing routes through Russia, the Caspian Sea, and the South Caucasus.

Kazakh-Iranian relations already have an economic basis. In 2025, bilateral trade turnover, according to the Kazakh side, amounted to about $430 million. The authorities of the two countries are discussing its increase, the development of rail freight, and port infrastructure.

However, economic prospects should not be confused with results already achieved. In May 2026, Deputy Prime Minister of Kazakhstan Serik Zhumangarin warned that the development of trade with Iran would slow down due to the conflict in the Persian Gulf and problems with payments. According to him, part of the contracts already concluded was put on pause due to business sanctions concerns.

And now—if the rapprochement of Tehran with the Commonwealth in the CIS+1 format (or in any other) begins to take specific shape, Washington may see in this not just "trade," but a political choice.

**From Avaza to Miami**

US President Donald Trump announced that he is inviting the presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to the G20 summit in the US, which will take place in December this year. In August 2026, the Kazakh Foreign Ministry confirmed that Kassym-Jomart Tokayev will take part in the December summit in Miami.

The invitation of Tokayev is an opportunity for Astana to strengthen relations with Washington and present Kazakhstan as an independent partner interested in investments, critical minerals, energy, and transport connectivity.

But on the eve of this meeting, Kazakhstan faces a difficult circumstance: the other day, the US Department of the Treasury warned that foreign financial institutions conducting certain transactions with Iran or its financial sector could face tough sanctions. On the threshold of the G20, Washington will evaluate not only the statements of the Kazakh leadership on multi-vector policy, but also the specific actions of state structures, banks, and companies.

If Kazakhstan limits itself to diplomatic contacts and legal trade, reasons for a principled conflict may not arise. If Kazakh financial institutions or logistics operators turn out to be involved in operations with sanctioned Iranian structures, the consequences could be quite tangible: restrictions for individual companies, complication of settlements, and an increase in compliance costs for business.

Kazakhstan today has to demonstrate miracles of multi-vector policy, constantly "doing the splits" between several geopolitical centers.

First, Russia remains an important trade partner and transit country for Kazakhstan. Second, China plays a significant role in investments, trade, and infrastructure projects. Third, the US and the European Union are important for the investment climate, financial ties, technology, and the export of certain resources. Finally, Iran can provide additional transport opportunities, but cooperation with it is associated with increased sanctions and other risks.

**Vicissitudes of Choice**

The appearance of the President of Iran in Avaza is not yet the beginning of a new integration era and not proof that the Commonwealth, which was practically written off, is turning into something geopolitically significant. For now, this is nothing more than a diplomatic initiative that may (or may not) receive a practical continuation.

For Iran, it means expanding regional ties. For Russia, an opportunity to strengthen interaction with partners outside Western institutions. For the countries of Central Asia, a potential exit to new markets and seaports.

For Kazakhstan, everything is more complicated. The economic benefits from cooperation with Iran may be quite real, but they do not negate the risks associated with US sanctions and international settlements. Against the background of preparations for the G20 in Miami, it is especially important for Astana to prevent a pragmatic economic project from being perceived as a political choice in favor of Moscow and/or Tehran.

That, perhaps, is the main intrigue and the main challenge of the "meeting of old friends" in the sunny resort town of Avaza.