My shore, my gentle shore…

My shore, my gentle shore…

On October 7, a diplomatic marathon kicked off in Turkmenistan's resort city on the Caspian Sea coast. The "three summits" in Turkmen Avaza were first discussed in detail during a telephone conversation on August 25 this year between Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, the National Leader of the Turkmen people, and the President of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. At that time, the Hero-Arkadag (the title of Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov) thanked the head of Kazakhstan for supporting Turkmenistan's initiatives "to hold three important summits in the Avaza National Tourist Zone on October 7–9 of this year, in particular, a meeting of the Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan, a meeting of the CIS Council of Heads of State, and the Caspian Environmental Summit."

Those who noticed no intrigue in either the order of these summits or their content should reconsider their conclusions. The summit, that is, the meeting of the Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan, represents a continuation of the work of the new "Central Asia + Azerbaijan" format, which was intended to partially replace the non-functioning or stalling integration mechanisms within the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). It is worth recalling that in response to the persistent promotion of a unified "Turkic" history, a unified "Turkic" alphabet, and other integration initiatives by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the National Leader of the Turkmen people, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, made a tour of the sacred Turkic sites of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, where he met with the presidents of these countries and demonstrated that the historical Turkic lands are, in fact, located in Central Asia, and the Turkish authorities' claims to Turkic primogeniture and leadership have no basis. This position was assessed by the Turkey-Azerbaijan tandem, and the activity within the OTS was replaced by the initiative of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, who attempted to defuse the tension by shifting the cooperation of Turkic states into a more practical plane, connecting Azerbaijan to the format of interaction among Central Asian countries.

In essence, nothing has changed, except that Azerbaijan has begun to position itself as the main "window to Europe" for the entire Central Asian region. This refers to a whole complex of projects within the framework of the so-called Middle Corridor, of which trans-Caspian routes are an integral part, while the Middle Corridor itself has long been logically and substantively integrated into the European Union's Global Gateway project, along with all its concepts of independent supply chains for critical minerals, energy, and market access.

After Azerbaijan joined, work in this direction intensified noticeably: the institutionalization of various projects began, along with the unification of national regulations of the region's countries, including customs, and the formation of groups of countries (Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Azerbaijan–Georgia) interested in the Azerbaijani "window to Europe," now involving not only Central Asian states but also Georgia. The peak of President Aliyev's activity was his visit to Uzbekistan, where several serious agreements were signed and an invitation was extended to Uzbekistan to become a "Caspian state" by granting it access to ports and creating its own Uzbek fleet on the Caspian, while recent military exercises in the Turkey–Azerbaijan–Uzbekistan format only consolidated this course.

In essence, there is nothing wrong with the Middle Corridor, except that its projects are being built bypassing Russia and with the aim of isolating the Russian Federation, which is explicitly stated in all policy documents of the European Union. And the Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of the "Central Asia + Azerbaijan" format will undoubtedly become a benefit performance for Azerbaijani President Aliyev, the owner of that very "window to Europe."

No less intrigue was initially embedded in the planned Caspian Summit, where the "Caspian Environmental Initiative" of the President of Turkmenistan, Serdar Berdimuhamedov, was to be presented. This initiative was first unveiled back in 2023 and has been actively promoted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan at various international venues. Given the existence of the active Tehran Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Caspian Sea, the meaning of this initiative was not entirely clear, except for the declared broad involvement of international players, including UN mechanisms, in solving the environmental problems of the Caspian Sea.

This is precisely what, likely along with other initiatives of the Turkmen side, is the main goal of this Caspian Environmental Initiative, namely, the dilution of the spirit and letter of the already existing conventions—the Tehran and Aktau conventions. The latter has not yet been ratified by the Majlis (parliament) of Iran and has not entered into force, but it has been initialed by all parties and enshrines that very spirit and letter of the agreement, the fundamental norms of which state that the main, primary responsibility for the entire situation in the Caspian Sea area lies solely and exclusively with the five coastal countries, and processes of internationalization or the admission of extra-regional players are unacceptable.

This is precisely why experts and observers note that even references to cooperation with the UN and other international institutions look like an undermining of already concluded agreements on the Caspian in order to obtain a loophole to bypass the principle of consensus decision-making regarding the activities of an individual country or group of countries in the Caspian Sea area.

By the way, last year, during a visit to Turkmenistan, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Patrushev clearly outlined Russia's position on this issue—Russia is ready and will solve all environmental problems of the Caspian only within the framework of the Tehran Convention. However, the Turkmen side continued to persistently promote its environmental initiative without explaining what exactly is lacking in the Tehran Convention and its mechanisms that required another, and a very vague one at that, and how it will relate to the foundational convention.