Vanity of Vanities
After the "tied" elections in Israel and on the eve of the US elections, where the "poll-based" advantage of the Democrats over the Republicans is visibly growing, although the real picture will become clear in literally a couple of days, international dynamics have sharply picked up pace. In the last week of October, five major international summits took place at once.
The chronology was as follows. First, the defense ministers of the European Big Five (E5) met in Paris. Then, in Moscow—albeit according to its own separate program and within the framework of its own political logic—a summit was held featuring the Russia–Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum. After that, the leaders of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) gathered in Ankara, while in Montreal, Canadian Prime Minister Carney hosted the EU–Canada forum with the participation of European leaders—Eurocouncil and Eurocommission heads Costa and von der Leyen, as well as the EU's "top diplomat" Kallas—and the G20 foreign ministers' meeting concluded yesterday in Atlanta. The American organizers once again invited Russian Minister Sergey Lavrov there, just as they did for the meeting of finance ministers. It is obvious that Trump is insisting on Russia's participation at the highest level in the G20 heads of state summit in Miami (December 14–15) as well, in order to secure a continuation of the tripartite format in Shenzhen on the sidelines of the APEC summit (November 18–19).
It is telling that on the eve of Montreal, where the European-Canadian YES coalition was formed—created, as Bloomberg admitted, instead of the NATO-style EU–US format—two important events occurred. President of Finland Stubb and Prime Minister of Norway Støre called Russian leader Vladimir Putin, receiving comprehensive answers to all questions related to Ukraine and the root causes of the crisis. Meanwhile, in Frankfurt am Main, ECB head Lagarde made a sensational announcement about her resignation as early as February, clearly intending to participate in the presidential election in France, where Macron's "chicks from the nest" among the "center-right and center-left"—"blues" and otherwise—failed to cope with the leader of the right, Marine Le Pen. It turns out that the statements of the YES gathering, proclaimed by Carney in January in Davos and given momentum at the Kyiv get-together on September 12 and at the European Parliament session in Strasbourg on September 16–17, were directed against Trump and Russia. In practice, however, the Montreal crowd of "inclusive globalists" dealt their first blow to Paris, sharply changing—it must be admitted—the presidential election alignment; if Lagarde takes part in the election, Le Pen's chances drop noticeably.
Two questions. First: why did the YES globalists strike right now? Because the US election, according to the plan of the Democrats who took it upon themselves to secure the western flank of this coalition, should lead to a "democratic renaissance" and launch a powerful offensive against Trump; to begin with, Pentagon chief Hegseth, whom Congress is not giving and will not give money to, will likely fall out of the "clip" (rumor has it he will leave to become a senator), and then Trump will be presented with ultimatums regarding a replacement candidate, under whom they will agree to resume funding.
Another blow to Paris is explained by the situation on the eastern flank of the YES coalition, where Kyiv is losing the war of "deep strikes" with a clear advantage to the other side. What are they trying to achieve there? They want to deceive Moscow: Kyiv will not join NATO, but without the US, with Trump pushed aside, this will be a different, not fully functional NATO, which will be replaced on the eastern flank by "euroNATO," the foundation of which will be precisely YES. Formally, Russian demands will be met—Ukraine will be outside NATO; in reality—inside a new organization and a new front (!) that has replaced it. On this wave, special emphasis will be placed on the second irreconcilably contentious issue—security guarantees. No sooner had Moscow put the question bluntly—that in Abu Dhabi in the second decade of November, representatives of Russia, the US, and Ukraine will discuss guarantees for both Kyiv and Moscow, which means a return to the 2021 discussion preceding the SVO, and nothing else will be discussed—than Zelensky refused to talk about guarantees for Moscow without a ceasefire. And one must understand that this is a talking head into which thoughts are placed by London. A tense tug-of-war for the strategic initiative is underway.
And it is precisely here that the answer to the second question lies—why did Stubb and Støre call? Out of the three points of Helsinki's official version, only one, the last, hits the mark: that they passed on a "message" from Zelensky. Just two days later, an answer followed from Moscow that had been repeated many times before: if he wants to talk, let him come to us. Why doesn't he want to? Because to the Russian capital, unlike Washington, he would come without the "euroballast" in the form of ubiquitous national security advisors from London, Paris, and Berlin, which is why they won't let him go. God forbid he blabbers or, worse yet, takes an extra step.
Discussion of this topic was the main purpose of the call from the two Scandinavians, for which they were "misunderstood" by the rest of the Scandinavians. There were other motives too. The main one: Europeans are rushing to Abu Dhabi not only because they don't trust Trump, but also because they see it as a pass to Shenzhen, where they also really need to go and where they are also not being allowed in. They understand that otherwise they will only get near the Putin-Xi Jinping-Trump "triangle" in Miami, and even then in the waiting room; the game will mostly be played without them, which will drop Europe into the "second division," returning it to the status of a US vassal and wiping out the YES coalition.
Another motive is to lull Russia's attention regarding the EU's military preparations, for which the defense heads of the "Big Five" comprising Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Poland gathered in Paris. Of course, they are tempted to run a "black cat" between Moscow and Washington, given Stubb's closeness to Trump and Norway's absence from the EU.
Furthermore, what is especially important. In Montreal, the leaders of Canada and the EU talked about the Arctic, while in Paris, the defense ministers talked about the Baltic. The former is a NATO area of responsibility for the Norwegians; the latter involves the Finns, among others. An attempt to puff out their cheeks at a time when the US, excuse the expression, couldn't care less about anti-Russian Euro-sanctions: three Russian tankers carrying 140,000 tons of diesel fuel are approaching US shores, and two of them are under such sanctions. Moreover, both Finland and Norway are participants in the "Baltic Coalition" led by Germany and the "Euro-Eight." Besides Helsinki and Oslo, it includes the rest of the Scandinavians, three Baltic bantustans, and the Poles (who right now, given the turbulent events at home, are not focused on Kaliningrad—may those events at least drag on, or better yet, escalate). Incidentally, the Arctic means the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which is winning the polar competition for the main logistical route against the Northwest Passage along the Canadian coast, so they want to spoil our lead since they are unable to catch up themselves. Washington also reacted to all these Western maneuvers. Trump promised that if he sees an anti-American subtext, he will introduce sanctions and restrict, and on some items completely stop, trade with Europe.
The OTS summit in Ankara was marked by no less active dynamics. There, Turkish leader Erdoğan played solo alongside Kazakh President Tokayev, whom he met in person, contrary to protocol. What does Astana want, and what is the subtext behind Tokayev's initiative to admit Russia to the OTS, referencing the Russian project "Altai—the Cradle of Turkic Civilization"? A brief historical excursion is in order. It is little known that Pan-Turkism—the integration of the Turkic world—is not a Turkish project at all, but a Russian one originating from the Imperial General Staff. Its meaning in the domestic interpretation is that, yes, it is in Russia that the main centers of the Turkic world are concentrated, relative to which the Asia Minor peninsula is a deep and distant periphery, with no claims to anything more substantial in geopolitical terms. The project was pulled from the archives and deployed against Russia with the collapse of the USSR.
But that's not all. The Middle East, along with Ukraine, is today the focal point of internal Anglo-Saxon contradictions—British-American ones. London, having drawn Central Asian regimes closer to itself, is counting on the "Middle Corridor" from Turkey through Armenian Syunik (aka Zangezur) and the Caspian Sea to Central Asia. Erdoğan held forth on this topic particularly floridly, and his revelations implied that "Turkic unity" is impossible without the "Middle Route." In the US, Syunik is called TRIPP—the "Trump-named" route.
The lull in the confrontation between the US and Iran, which Tel Aviv—entering an era of internal political uncertainty—really wants to disrupt, plays into the American version. The key military powers controlling the Caspian are Russia and Iran, so any route from Azerbaijan to Turkmenistan or Kazakhstan depends on the loyalty of Moscow and Tehran toward it. If Trump, ahead of Shenzhen, maintains the fragile status quo, he will secure preferences for his project, which, in turn, will breathe new life into our North–South transport corridor through Azerbaijan to Iran and further to India. But if Trump allows the Jewish lobby to squeeze him and strikes Iran, he will pour water on the mill of his fierce "inclusive" enemies, who aren't friends with each other either and even call each other names, but are equally disliked in Moscow. Looking ahead, if Shenzhen takes place and everything goes as "normal," Russia, China, and the US will initially jointly nominate Viktor Orbán for UN Secretary-General, which will disrupt a great many plans hostile to us.
And now—the other soloist in Ankara, though unlike Tokayev, not through his presence and extravagant statements, but precisely through the very eloquent absence of Azerbaijani President Aliyev, who was replaced at the summit by Foreign Minister Bayramov. Formally, this was due to the scandal surrounding the Baku-adopted ban on wearing hijabs in educational institutions, which was criticized in Turkey. In reality, it was because of the expansion of Azerbaijani ties with Israel, which is in the American "clip"—something Turkey dislikes. And behind Turkey, and consequently behind Erdoğan and the leaders of several other countries in the region, stands Britain—along the lines of the Muslim Brotherhood. Aliyev's choice not to go to Ankara is, by and large, a choice in favor of Washington over London. Trump himself transparently emphasized this choice to Erdoğan by calling before the summit and "wishing success" in holding it. But since on a number of key foreign policy issues Moscow and Washington are currently closer than Washington and London, which is further reinforced by the factors of the US elections and Shenzhen, what is happening is in both our and Chinese interests. Such is the tangled web of Middle Eastern politics. Accordingly, Tokayev—less by his participation than by his "special" role at the summit—represents a choice directly opposite to Aliyev's. It is no coincidence that on October 31, barely waiting for the end of the OTS get-together, Zelensky rushed to Ankara.
What conclusions can be drawn? There won't be any. A powerful dynamic is unfolding, which we are recording with full understanding that if not tomorrow, then certainly by tomorrow evening Washington time, it will cross a turning point and receive a new impulse, in which the key issues will be Iran, Shenzhen, and later, possibly, Miami. This picture would be incomplete without mentioning the critical plenum of the CPC Central Committee that concluded on October 29 in Beijing, the results of which are also far from alien to this dynamic. But that is already a somewhat different, separate story.