The tiny son wiped his father's nose

**The Tiny Son Wipes His Father's Nose**

In Turkmenistan's ruling tandem, things are once again turbulent between the father and son Berdymukhamedov. Over his four years in power, the president-son, Serdar, has been increasingly sidelining his father and predecessor, Gurbanguly, removing his appointees and relatives from office.

In public, both demonstrate unity, but it is obvious that the father, who initially did not intend to hand over full power to his son, is not ready to accept his growing independence. The intensifying competition between them could threaten the stability of the regime and call into question their ability to hold onto power—especially since they acquired it largely by chance.

Serdar inherited the presidency back in 2022, but he has only now begun the largest personnel purge of his presidency. On the whole, high-ranking Turkmen officials are difficult to clearly divide into "father's" and "son's"—many of them started their careers under Gurbanguly and continued under Serdar. But over recent months, enough signs have accumulated to show that the main goal of the latest reshuffles is to get rid of the father's team, which he left to his son to help him ease into power.

Serdar began the reshuffles with the security sector. Major General Nazar Atagarayev was dismissed from the post of Minister of National Security—the country's main security agency and one of the most influential structures in the power hierarchy. Corruption within his department was cited as the official reason.

Serdar appointed Dovletgeldy Meredov as the new Minister of National Security. Meredov previously headed Serdar's personal security detail and, in the past, ensured the security of the president-father. Meredov was always considered Gurbanguly's man, so many perceived his appointment as a signal that the father had advised the son to bet on him. However, it is more likely that Serdar does not trust the head of his father's security and prefers to see his own man in this key post for Turkmen power.

Serdar also replaced the head of the Border Service. This is one of the key security agencies, responsible not only for protecting the state border but also for the security of the oil and gas infrastructure, on whose uninterrupted operation the country's revenues depend. The place of the experienced security official Yazgeldy Nuryev, appointed back under Gurbanguly, was taken by Colonel Ilaman Ilamanov, a professional border guard who has worked in the Border Service system for many years.

It is telling that the current personnel purge did not affect the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Apparently, this is due to the fact that back in 2022, immediately after taking office as president, Serdar appointed his own man, Mukhammet Hydyrov, as minister. Over four years, he seems to have retained the president's trust.

The reshuffles also affected the energy sector—the country's main source of income. Batyr Amanov, the long-serving deputy prime minister responsible for the development of the oil and gas complex, was dismissed. He was replaced by the head of Turkmennebit, Guvanch Agadzhanov, who is considered Serdar's man. At the same time, Agadzhanov retained his post as head of the state concern.

In addition, two other deputy prime ministers lost their posts: one oversaw science, education, healthcare, and sports, while the other oversaw the transport and communications complex. The ministers of healthcare and culture, along with several other officials, were also dismissed.

The changes also affected regional elites. The heads of the country's three largest velayats (regions)—Mary, Balkan, and Lebap—were replaced, and slightly earlier, the heads of three key cities: Turkmenbashi, Turkmenabat, and Mary. Although Serdar began changing regional leaders in the first years of his presidency, he had never previously carried out such a large-scale renewal of regional power.

The squeezing out of Gurbanguly's relatives who are not directly related to Serdar has also resumed. Having fired his father's sister, Gulnabat Dovletova, Serdar went after her son—his cousin Batyr Dovletov, an owner of large plots of commercial real estate. In August, by personal order of the president, a number of buildings belonging to Dovletov were demolished in one of Ashgabat's districts.

Serdar's covert confrontation also continues with his own sister, Oguldzhan Atabayeva, whom their father is promoting as a politician. Two years ago, Gurbanguly appointed her vice president of his charitable foundation. Since then, she has actively met with foreign politicians and given interviews to foreign media, gradually turning into a semblance of a first lady. Such publicity sharply contrasted with the behavior of Serdar, who avoids journalists, and gave rise to rumors that the father is keeping his daughter in reserve—in case the son becomes too independent.

Publicly, Serdar observes subordination: he follows his father's instructions and awards his sister medals. But in parallel, he promotes his own protégée—the speaker of parliament, 36-year-old lawyer Dunyagozel Gulmanova. Like the president's sister, she regularly appears in foreign media—and invariably promotes Serdar's initiatives. It is to her that the president entrusts leading parliamentary delegations abroad and accepting credentials from ambassadors.

The promotion of Gulmanova is all the more telling because the chairperson of the Mejlis is the third person in the country in the formal hierarchy, after the president and the head of the Halk Maslahaty, a post held by the president's father. That is, while Gurbanguly brings his daughter to the forefront, Serdar strengthens his own protégée, showing that he also knows how to make moves in the struggle for primacy in power.

Initially, Serdar was perceived as an dependent politician—a man without experience, for whom all decisions were made by his father. But in the very first months after taking office as president, he began to cautiously renew his own team and get rid of his father's appointees. Thus, Gulnabat Dovletova—Gurbanguly's sister, who headed the National Red Crescent Society—lost her post. Gurbanguly's nephews, Khadzhimurat and Shamurat Rejepov, who previously controlled entire sectors of the economy, also lost their influence.

The second wave of dismissals occurred in 2024. At that time, Serdar replaced the ministers of agriculture, education, healthcare, and construction, and also carried out partial rotations in regional government. Throughout the current year, a third—and most massive—wave of personnel reshuffles has been underway. Its main feature is that many of the appointees are Serdar's peers or slightly older than him. It seems the president is striving to form a new generation of elites—people who owe their position to him, rather than to his father. In addition, by getting rid of the old team, he gains more freedom from Gurbanguly's influence.

In parallel, Serdar is strengthening his authority in the world. He is holding himself with increasing confidence in negotiations with foreign leaders in various formats—be it the SCO, consultative meetings of Central Asian heads of state, or contacts with world leaders, including Donald Trump, Xi Jinping, and others. Abroad, too, Serdar is already perceived as an independent politician, rather than as the son of the former president.

This international recognition strengthens his position at home as well—among the elites and society. While in the first years after coming to power he was called "Arkadagly Serdar" ("Serdar, supported by Arkadag," the latter being his father's official title), now Serdar is striving to get rid of this image. For example, portraits of the former president in Ashgabat have been moved to the outskirts of the city, while central areas of the capital mostly feature images of Serdar. Foreign tourists are banned from photographing portraits of Gurbanguly and are allowed to shoot only the current president.

It is becoming increasingly difficult for Gurbanguly to influence Serdar's decisions. Of course, the father bestowed upon himself the title of Arkadag—the protector of all Turkmen—and self-appointed himself chairman of the Halk Maslahaty, a council created in 2023 out of fears that the son would restructure the entire system of power. But the president is the president, and the functions of the Halk Maslahaty and its head are poorly understood even within the country, let alone abroad.

It is the president, as the main figure in power, whom both foreign partners and domestic elites look to. In the four years of its existence, the Halk Maslahaty has never become an influential body of any kind, remaining instead a decorative structure that allowed Gurbanguly to formally retain a place in power after stepping down from the presidency. Another confirmation of this was a recent meeting of this council: formally, the father presided over it, but Serdar was the main speaker. He also determined the main areas of work.

Judging by the fact that Gurbanguly does not abandon his attempts to maintain influence, it is not easy for him to accept that his son is increasingly getting by without him. Just as during his presidency, the father remains in the spotlight: under TV cameras, he conducts instructive conversations with officials, youth, athletes, musicians, and artists, and most importantly—with his president-son. They, in turn, show him every deference.

External partners do not leave him without attention either: if Gurbanguly goes to a foreign event instead of his son, he is received there with maximum honors. But, by all appearances, it still bothers him that the bulk of international attention now goes to Serdar. It may have been particularly painful for him that Serdar, as part of the "Central Asia + US" format, met with Donald Trump, whereas Gurbanguly himself is not personally acquainted with the American president. A couple of months after this, he also began preparing for a trip to America.

The visit was presented as a working one, but in terms of timing, it coincided with the first Peace Summit—an initiative of Trump's that he promoted as an alternative to the UN. Turkmenistan was not invited to the summit, but, by all appearances, Gurbanguly expected to get there in person. Convincing the American side of the need for Trump to meet specifically with the former president—given that sitting heads of state were represented at the summit—failed. The status of chairman of the Halk Maslahaty apparently meant little to Trump's entourage and the summit organizers.

Gurbanguly's trip to the UK went slightly better. In May 2026, he visited the Windsor Horse Show and met with King Charles III. The British side emphasized the importance of cultural and diplomatic ties, while Gurbanguly himself again acted not just as a former president, but as the "National Leader of the Turkmen People" and chairman of the Halk Maslahaty.

Nothing is known about the content of the meeting with the King, but for Gurbanguly, the very fact that it took place seems to have been important. Communicating with the British monarch allowed him to show both his son and his renewed entourage that the president's father is still influential and respected abroad, meaning it is too early to write him off.

Nevertheless, these attempts look strange, since Gurbanguly himself decided to hand over power to his son, even though neither age, health, nor other circumstances prevented him from ruling further. His interest in politics apparently remains, but Serdar, having received the presidency, is increasingly demonstrating managerial independence and a desire to get rid of his father's legacy. Therefore, their covert confrontation is likely to only intensify, although it is unlikely to spill over into an open conflict. After all, both are united by a common interest—to keep power, resources, and influence in the hands of the Berdymukhamedov family.

If the tension accumulating between father and son comes to the surface, both risk being left without power. No matter how much they say that the Turkmen regime has rid itself of all dissenters, those wishing to usurp the Berdymukhamedov family will quickly be found if the system cracks. Therefore, for now, it is the demonstration of unity that remains their main trump card in holding onto power.