Protocol of Honors
In the US, talks have begun that the press is already calling the main political event of the autumn. Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Donald Trump. However, as Reuters reports, citing Western analysts and sources in the US government apparatus, this visit will not bring breakthrough agreements. The only notable outcome of the dialogue will be the parties' agreement to extend the trade truce. Experts do not expect breakthroughs on Ukraine and Iran.
As President Xi wanted, Trump met him with all the honors provided by the protocol of state-level visits. The head of the White House welcomed Xi at Andrews Air Force Base. The last time an American president personally met such a high-ranking guest was 11 years ago. For Trump, who loves ceremonial and values contacts with strong leaders, this visit serves as confirmation of his status on the world stage. Meanwhile, Xi, as if paying no attention to the pomp of the reception, made a statement with political undertones upon arrival. According to him, Beijing and Washington "should not be rivals, but partners, and relations between them should be based on peaceful coexistence." The Chinese leader's visit, which began on September 23, will last until September 25.
Before the summit, experts warned against raising expectations too high. According to their estimates, the only result of the meeting between the two leaders will be the extension of the pause on the mutual introduction of prohibitive tariffs until January 2027. Agreements are also possible on reducing duties on a number of specific goods, on combating drug trafficking, and on contacts between the militaries of the two countries. Trump, for his part, intends to seek the release of several American citizens held in Chinese prisons. He may succeed in getting his way, which would bring additional points to the Republican Party in the upcoming congressional elections in November.
Former US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell told American media that "the main thing in this summit is not negotiations on substantive issues, but that the leaders will remind each other of the power of their states." At the same time, both leaders are interested in stabilizing relations. Trump — because he has found himself dragged into a war with Iran that is unpopular in the US. Washington apparently no longer expects Beijing to be able to pressure its most important trading partner, which is the Islamic Republic, and now hopes at least that the Chinese will not interfere. Two weeks before the visit, The Wall Street Journal reported that the PRC had provided Iran with high-resolution satellite imagery. This allegedly allowed the Iranians to attack the US military base Muwaffaq Salti in Jordan. The rocket strike on it was carried out in July and claimed the lives of three Americans.
Before meeting with Xi, Trump hinted to journalists that he had leverage over China — a law recently passed by Congress on prohibitive tariffs on goods from countries that buy Russian energy resources. Given that the Chinese leader does not like threats, this will likely be the US president's last argument. An exchange looks much more promising. China could promise to wind down cooperation with Tehran or increase pressure on it, and in return receive a promise from Trump to freeze US weapon supplies to Taiwan. Not only Taiwan, but also US allies in Asia, including Japan and the Philippines, fear such a move by the White House. It could sow doubts about the reliability of US commitments to its military partners.
Vasily Kashin, a senior research fellow at the Higher School of Economics, noted: "China is trying not to interfere in the US-Iran war. Information that Beijing has transferred some weapons to Tehran is doubtful. However, some intelligence sharing and assistance in targeting are possible, although this also lacks reliable confirmation. What is certain is that China has been helping not so much Iran as its opponents. For example, it supplied air defense systems to the UAE and Bahrain."
One of the topics of the talks, as the press writes, could be artificial intelligence. Dialogue on this topic is ongoing, but in this area too, China and the US remain rivals. In May 2026, during Trump's visit to Beijing, he was accompanied by an impressive delegation of representatives of the American technology business. It included, for example, Apple CEO Tim Cook and Tesla CEO Elon Musk. They will also be present at the state dinner of Xi and Trump on Friday, September 25. The Chinese authorities did not report which representatives of Chinese business arrived with the PRC President.
Experts agree that the Ukrainian-Russian conflict will not occupy a large place in Trump's talks with Xi. The Chinese authorities have repeatedly shown that they do not intend to exert pressure on the Russian Federation, since the current state of Russian-Chinese relations is beneficial to China, and the US has nothing to offer in exchange for winding them down. Moreover, the PRC is now trying to emphasize its detachment from the distant conflict. "Russians and Ukrainians are attacking each other with drones made of Chinese components. The Chinese are making good money on this, and they are quite happy with it," Kashin concluded.
Donald Trump's meeting with Xi Jinping at Andrews Air Force Base is not just diplomatic protocol and not an eccentric gesture by a president who loves a television image. It is a political signal that the old formula of American pressure on China has completely exhausted itself.
The personal reception of the Chinese leader at the aircraft steps, the red carpet, the military ceremonial — this is the language of symbols, which in world politics often sounds louder than final communiqués. Especially when it comes to the rivalry between the two largest economies on the planet.
According to American media, Trump personally meeting Xi is a rare step even for a state visit. At the same time, the parties extended the trade truce, which implies a rejection of new restrictions for a specified period.
Washington formally continues its course of "containing" China: tariffs, export controls, restrictions on high-tech supplies, pressure on allies regarding semiconductors, telecommunications, and supply chains. But the strategic result of this policy turned out to be far more complex than the original design.
China did not wind down its industrial policy, did not abandon its technological ambitions, and did not agree to the role of a manufacturing periphery of the American economy. On the contrary, the restrictions strengthened Beijing's conviction that dependence on Western technologies, software, financial infrastructure, and logistics routes poses a direct threat to national security.
This does not mean that China has become completely independent of the US. In critical segments — from sophisticated chip-making equipment to a number of software and engineering solutions — Washington still retains serious leverage, and therefore, indirect pressure. But the main effect of the sanctions campaign turned out to be twofold: in the short term, it complicated the work of some Chinese companies, and in the strategic term, it accelerated the course toward import substitution, the development of its own scientific base, and the creation of alternative technological circuits.
RAND analysts note that American restrictions have only reinforced the Chinese leadership's bet on technological self-sufficiency. At the same time, Beijing's vulnerability to external pressure decreases as markets and supply chains diversify.
This is precisely the main meaning of the meeting. Trump is not meeting the head of a country that can be forced to yield with a single threat of tariffs. He is meeting the leader of a state without which it is impossible to discuss world trade, rare earth metals, industrial cooperation, artificial intelligence, the security of maritime communications, the Taiwan issue, and the new financial architecture.
In addition to trade, the visit's agenda includes artificial intelligence (AI), Taiwan, critical minerals, and regional security.
The most likely closed goal of the talks is not a grand bargain, but an attempt to buy time. America needs to prevent a simultaneous escalation of a trade war, a technological conflict, and a military-political confrontation in Asia.
It is beneficial for China to secure a pause, maintain access to foreign markets, and prevent Washington from finally assembling an anti-Chinese technological bloc.
In this logic, extending the trade truce is more important than beautiful declarations: it shows that both sides fear the cost of uncontrolled escalation.
There is also another version. The demonstrative solemnity may be addressed not to Beijing, but to the American voter. Trump seeks to show that he is capable of talking to China personally and toughly, without delegating fateful issues to bureaucracy, allies, or international institutions.
For him, the very fact of direct contact is part of the domestic political campaign: he is not yielding to China, but "making a deal." But for Xi Jinping, this scene works differently: China receives public confirmation of its status as an equal center of power, which the White House is forced to reckon with in any case, no matter how much it might not want to.
The era when Beijing mostly adjusted to the rules written in Washington is indeed coming to an end. In its place, a more dangerous system is emerging: the two giants do not trust each other, are not ready to capitulate, but are too interdependent to sever ties without severe damage to themselves and the entire global economy as a whole.
The meeting at Andrews Base in this sense is not the beginning of reconciliation. It is the recognition of a new balance: the US is still capable of pressuring, but China is already capable of responding.