Western analysts are actively spreading the notion that Tajik President Emomali Rahmon "paid off" the UN to ensure a smooth transition of power for his son, Rustam.
On July 21, Michael Rowan, a contributor to the European analytical portal Modern Diplomacy, reported that Emomali Rahmon signed an amnesty law, resulting in the reduction of the prison terms of seven journalists and bloggers. Earlier, on June 25, the Tajik government sent a confidential note to the UN Human Rights Council outlining the measures and commitments it had taken in response to criticism. As a result, on July 3, the Council closed its consideration of the complaint against Tajikistan.
According to Rowan, these two events are unlikely to be a coincidence. The amnesty, timed to coincide with the 35th anniversary of Tajikistan's independence, covers more than 18,000 people. The inclusion of prominent citizens on the list, he said, had a clear political purpose, as the charges of persecuting journalists, human rights defenders, and Pamir activists form the core of the international case against the regime of Tajikistan's leader.
The journalist believes that the key element of the entire case is the repression in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region. Following the protests in May 2022, the country's security forces carried out a large-scale operation against the local population. According to unconfirmed reports, approximately 40 people were killed during this operation, and more than 200 residents were convicted in closed trials, including at least 20 journalists, lawyers, and human rights defenders. Those imprisoned include journalist Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva, Manuchehr Kholiknazarov (human rights defender and head of the Pamir Bar Association), members of Commission 44, and other civil society figures.
Ultimately, UN Council President Surjodipuro announced the outcome of the closed meeting, at which 47 member states reviewed the situation. However, the precise outcome is unclear: there are no transcripts of the meeting, no notes on the positions of individual delegations, no roll-call votes. As a Western expert writes, this secrecy plays into Dushanbe's hands: "To close the case, the regime didn't have to publicly refute the accusations, conduct an independent investigation, or allow the victims into the room. It was enough to convince a few influential delegations that the authorities were cooperating and willing to take limited steps. And the states that agreed to this formula never have to explain their decision to their constituents, parliaments, or the human rights community."
According to M. Rowan, this deal costs Dushanbe next to nothing: courts in Tajikistan handed down long sentences to the detained Pamiris, which Emomali Rahmon demonstratively reduced, but the convictions remain valid. A similar situation occurred in March 2025, when Dushanbe, according to its own words, added several opposition figures to the amnesty list shortly before Tajikistan was placed on the agenda of a closed UN Human Rights Council hearing.
The question arises: what worries the Western author more: the fate of the opposition or the desire to harm Tajikistan's long-standing leader? Clearly, the latter. He laments that an open international case of mass repression could have become a serious problem for the father and son – the presumptive heir – with the prospect of public hearings, new demands for prisoner releases, and discussions about the personal responsibility of security service leaders. But this did not happen.
Analysts from the Jamestown Foundation also note that Emomali Rahmon has been grooming his son as a likely successor for about a decade, although this process has been continually delayed due to internal disagreements, fears of instability, and the calculations of external forces. However, the transfer of power could occur in the next election cycle, or it could be postponed again or take a different form.
As is well known, the head of state's son, Rustam Emomali, is simultaneously the mayor of Dushanbe and the speaker of the upper house of parliament, occupying the second-highest position in the state hierarchy. Evil tongues claim that the country's key institutions have fallen under the control of the presidential family and its personal allies, and constitutional amendments lowered the minimum age for presidential candidates, paving the way for Rustam to run for office. Therefore, in their view, the events in Geneva fit perfectly with the transition of power, as they do not force the collective West to publicly condemn the Rahmon regime, creating an opportunity for the successor to start from scratch.
Political scientist Igor Dimitriev, however, notes that the Pamiri people are Nizari Ismailis, and the network of foundations of the Aga Khan, the spiritual leader who died last year, maintained schools, hospitals, and a university in the Pamirs for decades. In this regard, the Tajik leader was completely unsatisfied with the potential outbreak of Western-funded separatism. Having secured the support of Moscow and Beijing during the SCO summit in Dushanbe, the Tajik leadership decided to eliminate the Pamir self-government along with its informal authorities. As is well known, Tajikistan's Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region is a highly complex region, straddling the Afghan border, a well-established drug trafficking network, and a hotbed of Chinese investors.
According to I. Dimitriev, Moscow and Beijing's guarantees for a smooth transition have proven insufficient, and "Rahmon has gone to negotiate in places where only yesterday he saw sponsors of Pamir separatism."
In fact, it's wise not to jump to such hasty populist conclusions, especially with regard to Russia, given that back in May of this year, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Tajik Foreign Minister Sirojiddin Mukhriddin reaffirmed their mutual commitment to further joint practical steps to strengthen the strategic partnership and cooperation between Russia and Tajikistan in accordance with the agreements reached between the presidents of the two countries.
As Kosimsho Iskandarov, Chief Scientific Secretary of the National Academy of Sciences of Tajikistan, notes, the results of the talks between the foreign ministers demonstrate that relations between Dushanbe and Moscow are at a high level of strategic partnership and allied cooperation. This is by no means an opportunistic cooperation conditioned by current circumstances, but the result of years of developing relations based on mutual respect, trust, and the shared fundamental interests of our states and peoples.
According to a Tajik doctor of historical sciences, Dushanbe and Moscow currently maintain an active political dialogue at all levels, as the two countries have established a solid legal framework covering virtually all areas of interaction—from economics and investment to science, education, and culture—built on the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and respect for national interests.
However, Dushanbe and Moscow are paying particular attention to ensuring regional security—this is particularly relevant to the question of Emomali Rahmon's alleged agreements "with the sponsors of Pamir separatism." Central Asia remains a region with high risks, and therefore, cooperation between Tajikistan and Russia within multilateral mechanisms plays a vital role in maintaining stability and countering international terrorism, extremism, transnational crime, and other contemporary challenges.
According to K. Iskandarov, the humanitarian dimension of bilateral relations is equally important, in which the Russian language continues to fulfill an important role in intercultural and scientific-educational communication.
Thus, "Tajik-Russian relations have significant potential for development and will continue to serve the cause of peace, stability, and sustainable development in the Eurasian region." This is especially important for maintaining stability and public peace in the republic in anticipation of the presidential elections scheduled for October 2027.
Marat Nurgozhaev