President with an apparatus

President under the Apparatus

On September 5, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev approved the updated composition of the Security Council. It included the heads of key law enforcement and state agencies — the NSC, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the Prosecutor General's Office, the State Protection Service, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the Prime Minister, the Head of the Presidential Administration, and other officials.

In parallel, the building of the Security Council apparatus's own managerial vertical began: its head and three deputies were appointed.

Officially, this is explained by the improvement of public administration and the strengthening of national security. But the removal of the Security Council apparatus from a structural subdivision of the presidential administration into an independent state body with powers at least equal to those of the PA suggests that the very understanding of security by the authorities has changed.

Today, the threat to the state is no longer just war, terrorism, or crime. The significantly expanded list of potential dangers includes mass protests, elite struggles, conflicts within the security bloc, technological disasters, economic collapse, external and internal information attacks, and, finally, uncontrolled transition of power.

If we look at the new structure of the Security Council precisely from this angle, we can identify at least seven scenarios for which President Tokayev is seeking to prepare in advance.

**Scenario One. A New January**

Qantar is the most painful political trauma experienced by both the country and the system of power in the memorable January of 2022.

Therefore, the main "post-traumatic" conclusion can be formulated as follows: you cannot start reacting to a systemic crisis when it has already begun. An early detection mechanism is needed. And the current Security Council Apparatus, in terms of its official functions, resembles just such a mechanism.

Its tasks include organizing work to identify internal and external threats, preparing proposals for their prevention and neutralization, as well as preparing decisions to prevent crisis situations that could have socio-political, economic, military, or environmental consequences.

This is of fundamental importance.

The Security Council must deal not only with what has already happened. It must look for what might happen.

Consequently, a potential "new January" is now viewed not only as the area of responsibility of the "traditional" security forces — the Ministry of Internal Affairs or the NSC. This is a task for the entire multi-level national security system.

**Scenario Two. Elite Conflict, or Palace Coup**

Kazakhstan's history of recent decades — starting with the now half-forgotten "Rakhatgate" — shows that threats to presidential power can come not only from mass protests from below. No less dangerous is a situation where different groups within the elite begin to fight for influence, resources, and "access to the Body."

January 2022 is particularly indicative in this sense. Even the official rhetoric after the crisis contained the thesis of an attempted coup d'état and the participation of certain groups within the system. At the same time, an objective assessment of all circumstances still remains a subject of political and public debate.

But the institutional conclusion of the authorities is obvious: the president needs his own mechanism for monitoring threats not only to society but also to the state. And here, the new structure of the Security Council acquires special significance.

By law, the Security Council does not just discuss defense issues. It coordinates the activities of state bodies in the field of national security, law and order, and defense capability, can hear reports from heads of state bodies, monitor the implementation of decisions, and participate in discussing candidates for heads of a number of state structures.

This is already much broader than the classic understanding of the SC's role as a "military council." In essence, the Security Council gets the opportunity to look at the state from above. Where are agencies in conflict? Where are presidential decisions being sabotaged? Which security structures are competing "unhealthily" with each other? Which state bodies could potentially become independent centers of influence? Where do the economic interests of individual oligarchic groups arise that could grow into political influence?

This is precisely why an independent Security Council apparatus may turn out to be, for Tokayev, at least as important a structure for ensuring control over the elites as control over the street, for which the Ministry of Internal Affairs is quite sufficient.

**Scenario Three. Security Force Wars**

This is perhaps one of the most dangerous potential threats to the supreme power.

January 2022 showed how critical the issue of manageability of security structures is in an emergency situation. Everyone remembers the virtual paralysis of law enforcement agencies in Almaty and elsewhere at the height of the January events. The conclusion drawn by the authorities is unambiguous: when the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the NSC, the prosecutor's office, the army, the State Protection Service, and other security structures exist simultaneously with their own powers, interests, and control channels, the president vitally needs a single coordination center.

And this does not necessarily refer to preparing for a "coup d'état." A much more realistic danger is institutional conflict. When security agencies begin to protect their own interests, competing for resources, information, and influence, a crisis within the state can become uncontrollable even without any specific "conspirators."

**Scenario Four. External Interference**

Kazakhstan is located between several centers of power, has a long border with Russia and close economic ties with China, while simultaneously developing relations with Turkey, the EU, the US, and Central Asian states.

Since the start of Russia's war against Ukraine, the very security architecture of the region has changed.

An external threat today is by no means necessarily tanks, planes, or even drones.

It could be cyberattacks, information campaigns, or other attempts to influence public sentiment, sanctions pressure (the potential risk of falling under secondary sanctions has not been ruled out), economic sabotage, drug trafficking, and other transnational crime; interference in critical infrastructure, and finally, the "soft power" of our northern neighbor — a threat that should not be exaggerated, but which it would be unwise to completely ignore given what is happening in Russia today...

**Scenario Five. A Major Technological or Social Disaster**

For the first time, the head of the Ministry of Emergency Situations officially joined the new composition of the Security Council "by virtue of office." Why?

Let us imagine a major emergency — a large-scale accident at an energy facility, the destruction of critical infrastructure, a major flood, an industrial disaster, a pandemic, etc.

In the first hours, it is "just" an emergency. After some time, it becomes a question of the state's effectiveness. And a week later, it is a political crisis. Who allowed this? Why were we not warned? Who hid the initial information, failing to inform the "Center" in time out of self-interest? Why was the state unable to ensure the safety of its citizens? Is this not a full-scale threat to national security (read: supreme power)?

**Scenario Six. Economic Crisis**

For this threat, alas, there is a whole set of prerequisites in Kazakhstan — from a commodity-based economy with its fatal dependence on price conditions and the security of export routes, to energy security and the import dependence of the domestic market. Any of these factors individually — and even more so in combination with others — is capable of creating a threat to public peace, and therefore to national security.

Therefore, the president can no longer rely solely on the "economic bloc of the government" — cumbersome, slow-moving, and excessively regulated. Without being a major expert in economics, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev must have a ready answer "at hand" to the question: how to maintain the political stability of the state under potentially unfavorable economic scenarios? This becomes even more relevant in the context of the decision to direct 5 trillion tenge from the National Fund over the next three years to, as the president said, "finance strategically important projects with long-term socio-economic impact." At the same time, their "strategic importance and effectiveness" can so far only be judged from the president's words at the opening of the Kurultai session. What economic calculations justify such a decision remains anyone's guess. And, in essence, the only guarantee of success for this highly risky plan remains Tokayev's words: "There can be no question of any aimless spending of these funds."

Previously, the "sovereign's eye" and simultaneously the punishing sword was the "good old" presidential administration. The relevant department of the PA analyzed the effectiveness of such projects and associated risks. Now, the entire role of the presidential administration is reduced to its head's membership in the Security Council. As for the SC itself, no subdivision responsible for economic analysis is yet visible in its new structure. So, most likely, the same "economic bloc" of the government will be responsible for the ultimate success of the enterprise, which is to say no one — after all, over the next three years, the personal composition of the cabinet will change at least once.

Meanwhile, the Security Council itself, or rather its "all-powerful" apparatus, may well turn during this time into a kind of "autocratic" structure — an autonomous, highly influential decision-making center. And then we will have to talk not about the apparatus under the president, but about the "president under the apparatus."

However, this threat — the seventh in a row — may become relevant already for Tokayev's "successor" — which is perhaps what this was all started for...