Pharaoh's Games

## Pharaoh's Games

Nursultan Nazarbayev, the former president of Kazakhstan, has lost another lifetime privilege. By his decree of August 14, 2026, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev removed from the country's Foreign Policy Concept the provision that granted the first president the lifelong right to address citizens and government bodies with foreign policy initiatives.

This provision was linked to Nazarbayev's status as Elbasy and allowed him to put forward initiatives on key issues of foreign policy, state building, and security even after leaving office. This provision has now been officially repealed.

Earlier, in early 2023, Tokayev signed a decree repealing the law "On the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan – Elbasy." This law proclaimed Nazarbayev the leader of the nation (Elbasy) and guaranteed him lifetime privileges. Previously, the authorities were obligated to coordinate with him the main directions of domestic and foreign policy.

How should Tokayev's new initiatives be interpreted? Is Nazarbayev truly losing his fundamental ability to influence foreign policy, or is this purely symbolic, marking the completion of the "de-Elbasization" process and the transfer of power in the country?

Ainur Kurmanov, leader of the Socialist Movement of Kazakhstan, explains: "Previously, the law allowed Nazarbayev the opportunity to appeal to public opinion and act as a kind of patriarch with his vision of the country's future place in global politics and relations with neighbors and great powers."

He adds: "To some extent, this was an imitation of the practice of Deng Xiaoping and Lee Kuan Yew, who, even after leaving official positions, remained 'architects of reform', thought leaders capable of influencing foreign and domestic policy. Therefore, this right was granted to the first president of Kazakhstan."

**SP: And did Nazarbayev actually exercise this right? Or was the decision to strip him purely symbolic?**

"He never used this opportunity. At the same time, I don't believe Tokayev's decision to strip Nazarbayev of this status was purely symbolic. In fact, it was a loophole for adjusting foreign policy that remained in the former Elbasy's hands, and he could have hypothetically exploited it," Kurmanov replies.

**SP: Why now? Is this simply part of the constitutional reform process?**

"With this constitutional reform, Tokayev is showing everyone that a truly new 'pharaoh' has come to power, without any continuity with the previous dynasty, to use the ancient Egyptian analogy, with the 'zeroing out' of all previous presidential terms. Now it's important to show that this is a completely different political system, one in which the former Elbasy has no connection," Kurmanov believes.

He also notes that "the US, EU, UK, and Turkey have placed their entire trust in Tokayev and view him as the leader capable of guaranteeing their rights to the continued development, extraction, and export of traditional resources such as oil and gas, as well as rare and rare earth metals."

"In my opinion, the country is also undergoing a geopolitical pivot toward the West, as the previous 'multi-vector policy' has long since reached a dead end, and the ruling group can no longer effectively maneuver among the major powers in the face of the intensified struggle for Central Asia," Kurmanov continues.

"That's why Nazarbayev was stripped of his right to speak—to ensure that he doesn't suddenly contradict the official line, which is aimed at further distancing itself from Moscow and integrating Kazakhstan into the new Western construct through Trump's 'Peace Council' and 'Turkic integration.' After all, he can voice the demands of those elite groups who fear a shift in the balance of power in the region and possible discontent from China," the expert concludes.

**SP: Can we say that the process of "de-Elbasization" of Kazakhstan is complete? What other leverage does Nazarbayev still have?**

"Yes, one can come to that conclusion, since Nazarbayev has been stripped of all leverage and his former status. But it's not just a matter of symbols. And no matter how much Tokayev wants to completely shed the legacy of the previous ruler, the political system itself and the ideology of building a mono-ethnic state remain the same, established by the former Elbasy. In this sense, as in the personnel of the state apparatus, everything remains Nazarbayev-like," Kurmanov asserts.

He also points out that "the public burning of the regalia of the former 'pharaoh' also has a utilitarian purpose, as negativity is building in society due to the fact that the promises of January 2022 have never been fulfilled, and the social gulf between the dispossessed masses and the ruling class has only grown."

"The consequences of deregulation and the final liberalization of the economy and the privatization of the remaining state assets will now emerge, and Akorda urgently needs someone to blame for all these problems," Kurmanov predicts.

"And therefore, I believe the current crisis will be linked to Nazarbayev's personality, since blaming everything solely on Stalin and the Russian communists is no longer feasible. Against this backdrop, Tokayev will be presented as a leader forced to clean up the 'Augean stables' inherited from the past," the expert believes.

**SP: There is also such a thing as the 'Nazarbayev clan.' How strong is it? Or was he completely sidelined from power?**

"The concept of 'Nazarbayev's clan' is overblown, as the former Elbasy tried to fight clans, fearing the emergence of stable groups, and constantly pitted various cliques within his entourage against each other, acting as a supreme arbiter. One can only speak with more certainty about his family and his inner circle, among whom, admittedly, there was also disunity," explains Kurmanov.

"Nazarbayev's middle son-in-law, Timur Kulibayev, who supported Tokayev in January 2022, still retains his influence. True, he was also sidelined and lost some assets, but he has numerous protégés in national holdings and the state apparatus," he notes.

"Dariga Nazarbayeva may also try to somehow act through her people, but overall, the family members and closest associates of the former Elbasy are indeed significantly weakened, outwardly passive, and adopting a defensive stance," concludes Kurmanov.

"They can only 'revive' if Tokayev weakens, social discontent grows, or they receive external support. This threat, incidentally, will push the ruling group to carry out further purges and further 'weed out' Nazarbayev's family members and closest allies, preventing them from ever rising again," the expert warns.