Living on borrowed time — a risk for the authorities

Living on Debt — A Risk for the Authorities

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) remains one of the largest sources of financial support for countries facing crises, external financing deficits, and other macroeconomic imbalances. As of September 8, 2026, the total volume of outstanding IMF loans reached 124.3 billion SDR. SDR (Special Drawing Rights) is the fund's unit of account, whose value is determined by a basket of major world currencies. On the same date, 1 SDR was equivalent to $1.37, so the total volume of outstanding loans could be estimated at $170.6 billion.

Argentina remains the IMF's largest borrower, with an outstanding debt of 42.6 billion SDR, or $58.4 billion. It is followed by Ukraine (10.9 billion SDR, or $14.9 billion), Pakistan (8 billion SDR, or $11 billion), Egypt (7.9 billion SDR, or $10.8 billion), and Ecuador (7.1 billion SDR, or $9.8 billion). The next five include Côte d'Ivoire (4.1 billion SDR), Ghana (3 billion SDR), Bangladesh (2.9 billion SDR), Kenya (2.8 billion SDR), and the DR Congo (2.4 billion SDR). The top 10 combined account for almost 74% of all debt to the fund, with more than 61% held by the first five countries alone.

The volume of liabilities of the largest borrowers is linked, among other things, to the large-scale financial stabilization programs of recent years. In April 2025, the IMF approved a $20 billion program for Argentina, and in February 2026, an $8.1 billion program for Ukraine. For Egypt, the size of the active program was increased in March 2024 from $3 billion to $8 billion, while Pakistan was approved for $7 billion in financing in September of the same year. These programs are primarily aimed at maintaining macroeconomic stability and covering external financing needs.

Thus, large IMF loans continue to be mainly driven by the need to stabilize economies after severe internal or external shocks. In Central Asia, after a sharp increase in debt during the COVID-19 pandemic, the opposite trend is observed: the volume of outstanding loans from the fund in the region is consistently declining.

In the long-term dynamics, the debt of Central Asian countries to the IMF has decreased significantly. At the end of 1999, it stood at 693.9 million SDR, and by 2008 it had decreased to 116.6 million SDR. Then the figure rose again, reaching 236 million SDR in 2013, after which it declined to 123.7 million SDR by the end of 2019. A sharp rise occurred in 2020, when the region's debt reached 684 million SDR. Since then, it has been decreasing annually, amounting to 271.9 million SDR by the end of 2025 — 60.2% less than five years earlier.

Against this background, Kazakhstan occupies a special place. The country fully repaid its debt to the IMF back on May 24, 2000. The final early payment amounted to 295.8 million SDR, or about $385 million at the exchange rate of the time. As the fund itself noted, the early repayment was made possible by an improved external economic situation, including rising prices for the Republic of Kazakhstan's main export commodities — primarily oil — as well as economic recovery after the Asian and Russian crises of 1998 and 1999.

At the same time, in December 1999, the IMF approved an Extended Fund Facility of 329.1 million SDR for Kazakhstan. However, the country did not use these funds, treating the program as precautionary, and has not drawn new loans from the fund since repaying its debt in May 2000. According to IMF data, the Republic of Kazakhstan currently has no outstanding debt on loans from the fund.

Unlike Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan continued to use IMF credit support in subsequent years. Their combined debt rose particularly sharply in 2020 amid the pandemic, when the fund provided emergency financing to countries to cover urgent balance of payments and budgetary needs. Uzbekistan received 275.6 million SDR (or about $375 million at the exchange rate of that period), Tajikistan received 139.2 million SDR (or about $189.5 million). Kyrgyzstan was allocated two emergency financing packages totaling about $242 million. A significant portion of the region's debt accumulated by the end of 2020 was thus linked to anti-crisis support during the pandemic.

After the "corona-crisis" spike, the region's debt began to decline rapidly. It decreased particularly noticeably in Uzbekistan: at the end of 2020, the country's debt stood at 275.6 million SDR and remained at this level until 2022, after which it fell to 229.7 million SDR in 2023, 137.9 million SDR in 2024, and 82.8 million SDR by the end of 2025. Over five years, the figure decreased by almost 70%.

As of September 8, 2026, only Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan maintained outstanding debt to the IMF in Central Asia. Their combined liabilities amounted to 239 million SDR, or about $328 million. Compared to the end of 2020, the region's total debt decreased by approximately 65%. Kazakhstan, as already noted, has no outstanding loans from the fund. Note: Turkmenistan has had no transactions with the IMF from the outset; the fund has no data on this country and does not provide any.

The largest debt among the Central Asian countries belongs to Tajikistan: 111.4 million SDR, or about $152.9 million. This is followed by Uzbekistan: 73.6 million SDR, or $101.1 million. Kyrgyzstan's volume of outstanding IMF loans stands at 54 million SDR, or about $74.2 million.

The absence of loans does not mean the end of cooperation with the IMF. Kazakhstan remains a member of the fund, and the IMF regularly assesses the state of the country's economy as part of Article IV consultations. The latest such consultation was concluded by the fund's Executive Board in January 2026.

Ultimately, Central Asia today is significantly less dependent on IMF credit support than during the crisis periods of past years. At the same time, the situation within the region is uneven: some countries continue to repay previously received funds, while Kazakhstan has been interacting with the fund for many years without drawing loans. In this sense, the dynamics of debt show not so much the scale of cooperation with the IMF, but rather the degree of the countries' need for its financial support.