Hijab of Contention

**Hijab of Discord**

Despite a personal invitation from Recep Erdogan, President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev did not travel to Ankara for the summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). According to the state agency APA, he missed the meeting due to a tight work schedule and previously planned events in Baku: "On October 30, the final match and the official closing ceremony of the FIFA U-15 World Cup and Festival, held in Baku for the first time, will take place. The head of state's participation in the award ceremony was scheduled in advance."

On October 24, the FIFA U-15 World Cup and festival indeed kicked off in Azerbaijan, continuing until October 30, making the explanation look quite plausible. As a reminder, the cancellation of the Azerbaijani president's visit to Moscow on May 9, 2025, was also explained by Baku as his participation in events dedicated to his father, Heydar Aliyev. At the same time, declining the trip to Ankara does not mean abandoning the OTS, another pro-government mouthpiece writes. As one of the founders of the OTS, Baku will continue to participate in its work and development. Simultaneously, "an alliance cannot rely solely on a shared history and closeness of peoples. It requires mutual respect and recognition of the independence of each participant," journalists write, reminding Turkey and its leader of several unpleasant episodes.

According to Baku observers, negative trends in Turkish-Azerbaijani relations clearly emerged in early October, when an information campaign "aimed at friendship" began. Activity on social networks and among a segment of religiously motivated politicians increased noticeably after an Azerbaijani diplomat did not leave the hall during Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's speech at a UN session, unlike his Turkish counterpart and more than a hundred others. Later, a decision by the Cabinet of Ministers of Azerbaijan regarding a unified school uniform became a cause for dissatisfaction, with "the attacks becoming so sharp and offensive that they almost turned into a national trend in the Turkish media space."

One thing is obvious: the change in the Azerbaijani president's plans demonstrates his readiness to raise the stakes, fully aware of the geostrategic significance of the Caspian-adjacent country in the eyes of not only regional, but also global players.

In other words, against the backdrop of transport and logistics projects like the "Middle Corridor," any disputes over Israel or hijabs seem less defining today. Nevertheless, it was precisely these issues that served as the formal pretext for a rift whose consequences could prove long-lasting.

In the Russian expert and, to some extent, media community, a well-founded opinion is gaining ground that Ilham Aliyev's refusal to go to Ankara for the OTS summit against the backdrop of the scandal surrounding the "hijab of discord" is a clear sign of tectonic shifts in Transcaucasian geopolitics. References to "schedule" discrepancies, translated from diplomatic language, signify official Baku's clear dissatisfaction with the Turkish side's comments on the story involving the ban on hijabs in Azerbaijani schools, which are perceived as lecturing and interference in internal affairs. Even the resignation of the chief advisor to the President of Turkey, Oktay Saral, failed to make Aliyev reconsider his decision not to go to Ankara for the OTS summit. Instead, Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov assumed the chairmanship, reaffirming commitment to "Turkic integration" and readiness to develop shared cooperation mechanisms. Notably, despite the cooling in bilateral relations, Aliyev congratulated Erdogan and his people on the Day of the Proclamation of the "New Turkey" on October 29.

It is worth recalling here that in 2021–2022, Azerbaijani-Iranian relations also experienced a difficult period, but they have stabilized noticeably in recent times. Tehran reacted with extreme restraint to protest actions in Azerbaijan, where sharp statements addressed to the southern neighbor were likewise avoided. Moreover, in July 2026, the railway authorities of Russia, Azerbaijan, and Iran signed a trilateral protocol on the development of the "North – South" International Transport Corridor, and freight turnover, especially transit to Iran, is already showing substantial growth. The marked cooling of Turkish-Azerbaijani relations reduces the risks that interested Turkish circles will be able to use the ethnic factor to pressure this corridor in order to reroute cargo flows exclusively along the "Middle Corridor" (also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route), bypassing Russia and Iran. Azerbaijan is actively developing railway communications in Nakhchivan, which is planned to be converted into a hub for three directions: to the main territory of the republic through the Syunik Province of Armenia, to Turkey via the Sadarak – Diluju line, and to Iran through a connection in Julfa, the Russian Foreign Ministry notes. The outline of the South Caucasus transport framework is already emerging. It is formed by existing and prospective cargo flows: "North – South" is a route from Russia to Iran with access to India and the Middle East; "East – West" represents supplies from Central Asia to Europe and Turkey, alongside expectations of growing China – Europe trade via the "Middle Corridor." At the same time, a conflict of interests between groups supporting competing transport and logistics projects cannot be ruled out: individual countries and external players promote their own routes, which creates political and logistical difficulties.

Baku's trade and logistics initiatives are separated as much as possible from political, cultural, or religious disagreements. Azerbaijan is building its strategy as a global transit hub. A country striving to become a center of regional logistics cannot fail to maintain working relations with everyone. Here, the status of a hub directly conflicts with Turkey's position and its priorities.

Historically, Turkey claimed a special relationship with Azerbaijan. However, now for Baku, the concept of "One nation – two states" is undergoing certain changes. In Baku, people are increasingly recalling not Recep Erdogan, but the founder of the republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who, unlike the current head of state, proclaimed the principle of non-interference in the affairs of neighbors.

Azerbaijan reacts sensitively to any attempts at external interference in its internal affairs, even from Turkey. Unlike Turkish activists and politicians associated with certain radical religious associations, Russia respects Azerbaijan's secular model, which contributes to the strengthening of mutual trust designed to finally extinguish the "crisis of emotions" of 2025 – the first half of 2026.