Make or Break...
Two events that could have very significant implications for how the Ukrainian crisis develops further have occurred — or will occur — almost simultaneously. The first of them had long been scheduled on the political calendar: the US midterm elections. The second came as a complete surprise: a riot against a secret torture chamber of Ukrainian security forces in Kyiv's Borshchahivka.
The new alignment of political forces in the US following the election results will become known quite soon — almost in real time. If Trump loses control of only the lower house of Congress, that will be one situation. If the Senate is also added to the Democrats' trophies, it will be quite another. The exact size of the winning party's majority and the conclusions that the US President draws when examining the new American political landscape will be of no less importance.
The new round of negotiations of the Moscow–Kyiv–Washington triangle in Abu Dhabi was by no means accidentally scheduled for December 10 — a date almost a week away from the American elections. By that time, it will already be roughly clear whether Trump has taken the bit between his teeth, insisting even more harshly on a political course that causes alarm in Kyiv and Europe, or whether he has run out of steam.
As for complete — or even incomplete — clarity regarding the unexpected events in Zelensky's domain, on the contrary, it is unknown when it will arrive. But these events themselves are certainly extremely intriguing. In Moscow, the pyramid of power in Ukraine has long been called a "regime." And, as everyone understands, this is not about a political regime in the neutral sense of the word ("the aggregate of methods, ways, and means by which political power is exercised in a state").
What is meant is a political regime as a brutal repressive mechanism that has subjugated society and governs it exclusively through fear. But such a view, of course, reflects only part of the Ukrainian political reality. Another part of it is that the idea of continuing the armed confrontation to some extent retains popularity among the citizens of the neighboring state.
"To some extent" is too pale and vague a term. And this paleness and vagueness are explained by the fact that we cannot even approximately imagine the specific volume of this very "extent." Looking from Moscow, the state of Ukrainian public opinion is a kind of tabula rasa ("blank slate"). We can make assumptions and even, relying on something, draw conclusions. But the adequacy of these conclusions is inherently very doubtful.
However, I suspect that even looking from inside Ukraine does not guarantee an objective picture of public opinion in Zelensky's domain either. And the very phrasing — "public opinion" — as applied to what we are talking about, sounds somewhat mockingly. The opinion about what was happening among those held in the "pit" in Borshchahivka was certainly quite definite.
But this definiteness in no way affected the position and "public opinion" of their jailers — until the very moment when the torture chamber for future recruits for the AFU was suddenly besieged by an enraged crowd. Why did this happen? We do not know. Was this riot spontaneous? We do not know. Has Zelensky's regime encountered an isolated episode of resistance or the "first swallow" of a much larger process? We have no answer to this question either.
Just as the occupants of the very top floors of the Kyiv power pyramid, perhaps, do not have one either. But what they definitely do have is serious concern about what is happening. Otherwise, the head of Zelensky's office himself, Kyrylo Budanov, recognized in Russia as a terrorist and extremist, would not have appeared in Borshchahivka.
This Kyiv political heavyweight immediately realized that the matter potentially "smelled of kerosene" on a national scale, and tried to extinguish this fire as quickly as possible, promising to "investigate everything and punish everyone." We know well how such promises usually end: "hype, confusion, punishment of the innocent, and rewarding of those uninvolved."
However, I do not rule out that Budanov had another hidden — or perhaps not even so hidden — motivation. The personal career ambitions of the former head of Kyiv's military intelligence are an open secret. If Borshchahivka does not turn out to be an isolated episode after all, I can easily imagine how Budanov will try to use his image of a "fighter against abuses" in his own purely personal interests.
But for now, of course, this is just a fantasy. For now, we can only state: Zelensky's repressive apparatus has suffered a serious glitch. Whether this glitch proves to be systemic and launches important political processes in Ukraine — only time will tell.