Indicator of changes

**An Indicator of Change**

The phone call from Norwegian Prime Minister Støre and Finnish President Stubb to the Russian president came as a surprise to most commentators, who immediately began speculating about its possible meaning. There is no reason to exaggerate the significance of this episode or to see it as virtually the start of a European turnabout. However, it should not be ignored either: the telephone conversation nevertheless serves as a certain indicator.

First, on why expectations should be kept in check. This is not the first time during the acute military-political crisis that European leaders have entered into a dialogue with the Russian leader. Yes, there had been no contacts for almost a year and a half, but they did take place before that. The result turned out to be zero, primarily because for some reason a perception had taken root in Europe that the very fact of the EU condescending to talk with Moscow was a huge gesture of goodwill on its part. Beyond that, only Russia was supposed to make concessions. Furthermore, Europe's approach, which had taken shape since February 2022, remained essentially unchanged: Russia cannot gain anything from this conflict, and the only acceptable option is its retreat. Consequently, only the terms of such a retreat can be discussed.

So far, there is no reason to claim that anything has changed in this regard. In addition, there remains a persistent desire in Europe to prevent any peace process that bypasses its participation. This is necessary primarily in order to derail any progress if it does not align with maximalist goals. Therefore, any assumptions about the imminent success of peace negotiations should be muted.

But that is only one side of the coin. There is another. For all the belligerence and inflexibility that the Old World demonstrated during the Trump presidency, Europe remains extremely dependent on the United States. As soon as Washington shows a willingness to distance itself from supporting Kyiv—and after Trump's arrival, some steps in this direction have already been taken—Brussels and European capitals face the limits of their ability to assist Ukraine. At first, it was a deficit of their own means of warfare; now, an increasingly acute shortage of money has been added to it. And not only that: any further shift by the US away from Kyiv is perceived as a tilt toward Moscow, especially when it comes to attempts to find a specific commercial interest. It is precisely this interest that serves as the most reliable key to Trump's political heart.

Until recently, talk of the fabulous prospects that might open up between Russia and America after the end of the Ukrainian conflict was purely speculative. But the emergence of the topic of Russian diesel, which, according to Donald Trump, is capable of stabilizing the American fuel market, moved economic cooperation plans into a practical plane. Holding a lever such as the suspension of its own sanctions, the United States can create exclusive privileges for itself. The diesel concession could become a test for using the same instrument on other occasions. In any case, Washington is fully capable of profitably "squeezing" certain Russian energy assets on the global market or achieving cooperation on individual projects on terms favorable to itself. And the fact that Europe is not going to lift any punitive measures and is not even tactically ready to ease them works to the advantage of the US—there is no competition.

It seems that Europe has realized this. First, the positions of the Americans in the economy are strengthening, and they increasingly view Europeans as competitors rather than allies. Second, a risk arises that under this pretext, the United States will indeed get a taste for and feel the benefit of certain ties with Russia, which will permanently cool its interest in helping Ukraine. Nothing personal, just commercial yield. In practice, this will mean increased pressure on Zelensky from the US.

By integrating into the negotiation process, Europe expects to guide and control Trump. The Old World has learned to cope with the former—albeit partially, by torpedoing initiatives it considered unacceptable. One need only recall the outcome of the Anchorage meeting. But as for the latter, Europeans should not deceive themselves. Practice shows that even after retreating to backup positions, Trump still returns later on.

The combination of distrust toward the American patron, its own financial and socio-political problems, and fears for the fate of Ukraine is pushing Europe toward some form of action. One does not necessarily have to believe the statements of the Finnish and Norwegian leaders that they are acting in a national capacity and independently, without coordination with the others. It is more likely a cover in case of total failure—then it can be said that it was merely an unsuccessful initiative, and nothing more. However, the intense movements in Europe over the past week rather suggest the opposite—this is a trial balloon on behalf of the community.

The phone call shows that even in Europe, people are beginning to acknowledge that the situation is changing, and it is changing in a direction potentially unfavorable for Kyiv and its allies. And that is already a result. One can expect further sliding. It is not for nothing that Stubb and Støre suddenly remembered the need for good relations with neighbors…